Europe Must Think Very Carefully Before Leaving Ukraine Hung Out to Dry
So far, Europe’s support has been shockingly selfish, hesitant, and strategically short-sighted.
Europe likes to believe it has stood firmly with Ukraine. It has given speeches, passed resolutions, imposed sanctions, and sent some weapons. But none of this changes the fundamental truth: Europe has not done nearly enough. Not morally, not strategically, and certainly not proportionate to the scale of the threat. A continent that will pay the price of a Russian victory has behaved as if this war is something happening far away.
The uncomfortable reality is that Europe’s support has been shockingly selfish, hesitant, fragmented, and politically convenient rather than strategically serious. Leaders talk a great deal about “European values,” but they act like cautious accountants. Meanwhile, Ukraine fights for its survival—and for the security of the entire continent.
And the clock is ticking.
Europe’s hesitation is built on delusion
For nearly three years, the entire European political class has avoided the most important question of all: What happens when the United States doesn’t show up?
Europe has acted as if U.S. support is automatic, inevitable, guaranteed—regardless of who is president, regardless of public opinion, regardless of domestic polarization in Washington.
But that assumption is false. Deeply false. Dangerous in its falseness.
The United States is no longer a serious partner for European defense. NATO’s Article 5 commitment exists on paper, in ceremonies, in diplomatic language—but not in political reality. Recent polling shows roughly half of Americans either oppose or express serious doubts about defending European allies. The other half will provide speeches and symbolic gestures, but not the massive, sustained commitment that an actual European conflict would require.
Donald Trump is not an anomaly; he is a symptom of a divided, polarized, inward-looking America that no longer sees Europe as worth defending. And even those who claim to support Europe will not send the weapons, funding, or intelligence support necessary when it actually matters.
Europe’s entire security architecture is built on a partnership that no longer exists.
Does letting Russia destabilize Europe hurt American interests? Of course it does. But America now lives in a reality where large segments of the population have limited understanding of—much less concern for—abstract concepts like “European security architecture” or “containment of revisionist powers.” They see distant problems that don’t affect gas prices or grocery bills. Europe waiting for America to suddenly develop strategic sophistication is a fantasy.
And one thing is nearly certain: if a major war breaks out on European soil, the United States will not send an army to fight it. Not under Trump. Not under a Democrat. Not under any president, with any Congress, under any circumstances. That era is over. American ground forces cannot be relied upon to defend Europe, no matter what treaties say, no matter what diplomatic language promises.
Europe must face this reality now—or face catastrophe later.
If Ukraine falls, Europe pays the price—not the United States
Europe’s hesitation would be foolish even if the U.S. were fully reliable. But the strategic reality is even harsher: Europe has far more to lose than America if Ukraine collapses.
If Russia conquers and absorbs Ukraine:
Europe gains a battle-hardened Russian army on its direct borders.
Russia gains Ukraine’s industrial base, manpower, and strategic depth.
The Kremlin becomes convinced that aggression works—and that NATO blinks.
The frontline of confrontation moves hundreds of kilometers west.
Ukraine is not a “charity case.” It is Europe’s shield. Ukrainian soldiers are absorbing the full weight of Russian militarism—so Europeans don’t have to. Every Western hesitation, delay, or excuse makes a Russian victory more likely, which in turn makes a future confrontation with NATO more likely.
Europe’s approach has been strategically suicidal.
Europe’s wealth is vast; its will is weak
The European Union’s combined GDP is roughly ten times that of Russia. Its population is three times larger. Europe has every advantage imaginable—except political will.
And the evidence of this failure is everywhere.
Europe let Biden drive the strategy for nearly three years—accepting his glacial pace, his restrictive rules of engagement, his obsessive fear of “escalation,” his refusal to provide weapons that could actually win. European leaders grumbled privately but complied publicly. They deferred to Washington even when Washington’s strategy was transparently failing.
And now? Now Europe cowers before Donald Trump’s threats to abandon NATO. European capitals panic at his rhetoric, scramble to appease him, and desperately try to prove their worth to a man who has made clear he does not value the alliance.
And it’s not just NATO. Europe folded when threatened with tariffs and trade sanctions. A continent with an economy larger than America’s trembled at the prospect of a trade war and rushed to negotiate, concede, and accommodate.
This is unconscionable.
Europe is not a dependent client state. It is a continent of 450 million people with a combined economy rivaling China’s. It has the European Union for economic coordination. It has NATO for military alliance. It has every institutional structure necessary for unified action.
Yet it behaves like 27 sovereign nations each acting like feuding city-states, each waiting for someone else to lead, each calculating narrow national interests, each terrified of making a decision that might cost votes in the next election. The machinery for collective European power exists. The will to use it does not.
Europe could already have:
created a continental artillery and ammunition industrial base
provided Ukraine with air defenses on a scale that would end Russia’s missile terror
equipped Ukraine with armored brigades at a decisive level
built its own autonomous command structure capable of operating even if Washington hesitates
funded Ukraine at a level that reflects Europe’s actual stake in the war
Instead, Europe has delivered incremental, symbolic support—always late, always partial, always reactive.
And the pace has been inexcusable. For nearly three years, Ukraine has bled manpower and infrastructure while Europe holds summits, debates procedures, and acts like spectators to a distant crisis. Ammunition shipments are announced with fanfare, then delivered in dribbles months later. Air defense systems are promised, then delayed by bureaucratic processes. Restrictions on weapon usage remain in place while Russian missiles destroy Ukrainian cities.
This is not serious. This is not urgent. This is the behavior of a continent that does not believe it is fighting for its own survival.
Factories remain on peacetime schedules. Leaders hold summits instead of making commitments. Parliaments debate procedural issues while frontline soldiers run out of shells.
Europe has behaved not like a continent facing the largest land war since 1945, but like a boardroom trying to minimize budget overruns.
The dangerous illusion: that Russia can be “appeased”
Some European capitals still cling to the fantasy that the conflict can end “through negotiation,” “through compromise,” or “through giving Russia something it wants.”
But there is no rational path to appeasing Russia that secures European interests.
This is not a situation where Moscow wants a limited concession. The Kremlin wants to revise the entire post-Cold-War European security order. It wants to control Ukraine’s future, limit NATO’s influence, and restore a sphere of privilege over former Soviet space. Russia has accepted tactical pauses in past conflicts—Georgia in 2008, for instance—but only when forced to do so, and only as preparation for the next phase of expansion. A regime that defines its success through confrontation cannot be satisfied with partial prizes. It pauses only when forced to pause. It stops only when stopped.
Appeasement of this kind does not end the conflict; it shifts the front line westward. A Ukraine carved up or coerced into surrender is not peace. It is merely an intermission before the next stage of Russian ambition. Any European strategy built on appeasing Moscow is strategically reckless and will end badly.
Europe needs to finally understand that diplomacy without deterrence is not diplomacy. It is begging.
Exclusion without deterrence invites escalation—and Europe is already experiencing it
Europe’s approach to Russia has been built almost entirely on exclusion: sanctions, diplomatic isolation, economic decoupling, and rhetorical banishment from “civilized” Europe. But exclusion does not neutralize a nuclear-armed power. Without corresponding military deterrence, exclusion destabilizes—and provokes exactly the kind of response Europe is now experiencing.
A Russia that feels excluded, humiliated, and encircled—but not deterred—does not quietly retreat. It seeks leverage through sabotage, disinformation, election interference, energy manipulation, and infrastructure attacks. Europe is already seeing this: Baltic Sea undersea cables cut in 2023-2024, GPS jamming, arson attacks across multiple countries, assassinations on European soil, and relentless efforts to fracture European political cohesion.
This is not an accident. This is the predictable result of attempting to “exclude” Russia from Europe without actually deterring it through credible military capability.
Russia will not disappear because Europe declares that it should. Russia is geographically, historically, materially, and strategically part of Europe’s security landscape—whether Europeans like it or not.
Managing Russia is unavoidable. Appeasing it is strategically reckless. Excluding it without deterrence guarantees hybrid warfare. Deterring it requires strength—not sanctions theater, half-measures, or reliance on America’s electoral whims.
Commitments are fragile in a polarized era
Even if Europe spends 5% of GDP on defense, even if it triples artillery production—even then, modern commitments are not what they once were. Domestic politics across the entire West are volatile. Governments change. Coalitions fall. Parliaments fracture. Social media amplifies division. Foreign policy is now partisan, not consensus-based.
That means deterrence cannot rely on “assumed” commitments. Only on capability + political resilience + strategic clarity.
Europe today has none of the three in sufficient quantity.
Europe cannot afford the luxury of fear or hesitation
Europe is at a turning point. It can no longer behave as if someone else will solve its strategic problems. America may help—or it may not. Russia may escalate—or it may regroup. Ukraine may hold—or it may be overwhelmed. In every scenario, the determining factor will be Europe itself.
Fear is not a strategy. Hesitation is not a strategy. Underfunding is not a strategy. Relying on Washington’s stability is not a strategy. Pretending Russia can be bought off is not a strategy.
There is only one strategy that protects Europe:
A strong Europe, a fully supported Ukraine, a defeated Russian aggression, and a continent no longer dependent on the political fluctuations of the United States.
History will judge Europe’s choices in this moment
Future generations will look back at this period with one of two reactions:
Either:
“Europe woke up, understood the stakes, and rose to defend its own security.”
Or:
“Europe hesitated, wavered, talked, delayed—and allowed a disaster that could have been prevented.”
Europe can choose which of those sentences becomes true.
But the window for choosing is closing quickly.