While the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remained unresolved after 1948, the next decisive phase of regional tension was not primarily about Palestine. Instead, the decade that followed centered on the rising confrontation between Israel and Egypt, shaped by Cold War alignments, colonial collapse, and Arab nationalism. Palestinians were deeply affected by the outcomes — particularly in Gaza — but they were not the driving actors. This was a period of shifting power, hardened positions, and the emergence of new ideologies that would eventually shape the next war.
Between Wars: 1949–1956
The armistice lines of 1949 brought a halt to open warfare, but not to violence. The region remained in a state of "no peace, no war":
Arab states refused to recognize Israel or engage diplomatically.
Israel fortified its new borders and absorbed massive waves of immigration, including Holocaust survivors and Jews from Arab countries.
Cross-border raids from Palestinian fedayeen (guerrillas, often operating from Egypt or Jordan) provoked Israeli reprisals that frequently targeted civilians, escalating regional tensions.
Israel grew stronger militarily and more integrated economically, but Palestinians remained in limbo — stateless, in refugee camps, under Jordanian or Egyptian rule, and increasingly angry.
Prelude to Suez: 1955–1956
In 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser, a former army officer and veteran of the 1948 war, became President of Egypt. He was young, bold, and deeply anti-colonial — and he quickly emerged as a transformational figure in the Arab world.
Nasser was not just a head of state. He was a visionary populist, blending Pan-Arab nationalism, military discipline, and revolutionary rhetoric. He promised to modernize Egypt, end Western dominance, and restore Arab dignity — all while taking an increasingly hard line against Israel. To many across the Middle East, he was a symbol of post-colonial liberation. To Israel and the West, he was a rising and unpredictable threat.
Rising Arab Nationalism
Nasser rejected colonial domination and sought to unite the Arab world under Egyptian leadership.
His rhetoric increasingly targeted Israel and the "imperialist" powers that supported it.
Soviet Arms and the Czechoslovakia Deal
In 1955, Egypt signed a major arms deal with Czechoslovakia, backed by the Soviet Union — the first such agreement between a non-aligned Arab state and the Soviet bloc, marking a pivotal shift in Cold War alliances.
This came after Western powers refused to sell Egypt modern weapons, pushing Nasser toward the Soviet bloc.
Egypt rapidly modernized its military with Soviet tanks, MiG fighter jets, and artillery.
For Israel, this was a strategic alarm bell: a powerful, hostile neighbor was arming with superpower help.
Fedayeen Raids from Gaza
Egyptian-controlled Gaza became a launchpad for Palestinian fedayeen raids into southern Israel.
These attacks targeted civilians and infrastructure, often drawing Israeli reprisal operations that also frequently struck civilian targets. Both sides targeted military and civilian objectives, with each accusing the other of deliberate attacks on civilians.
The Gaza frontier grew increasingly violent and politically volatile.
The Blockade of the Straits of Tiran
Egypt had closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, effectively blockading Eilat, Israel's access to the Red Sea.
This cut off trade with Africa and Asia.
Israeli leaders warned that continued closure of the straits constituted an act of war.
Nasser's Nationalization of the Suez Canal
In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, previously controlled by British and French shareholders.
Britain and France, seeing their strategic and commercial interests threatened, secretly began planning to retake the canal by force.
By late 1956, the fuse was lit: Nasser's ambitions, Egypt's rising military power, Israeli security concerns, fedayeen violence, a maritime blockade, and Western imperial resentment were all converging. Israel, Britain, and France were about to strike a secret deal.
The Suez Crisis (1956): Imperial Decline, Regional Shift
Although Palestinians were affected by the fallout, the Suez Crisis was not fundamentally about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was a geopolitical confrontation between Egypt, Israel, Britain, and France, driven by overlapping strategic aims:
Egypt sought to assert post-colonial sovereignty, particularly over the Suez Canal.
Israel aimed to end fedayeen raids, reopen the Straits of Tiran, and shatter Egyptian military confidence.
Britain and France were reacting to Nasser's nationalization of the canal, which threatened their global interests.
Palestine — and Palestinians — were largely bystanders to the planning, even as they remained embedded in the region's volatile balance.
The Secret Alliance
Britain, France, and Israel made a secret agreement:
Israel would invade the Sinai Peninsula.
Britain and France would intervene under the pretext of separating the warring parties, but in reality to seize the canal.
In October 1956, Israel invaded Sinai. Britain and France launched air strikes. Militarily, Israel succeeded quickly — but politically, the operation collapsed.
Superpower Reactions
The U.S. (under Eisenhower) and the Soviet Union both condemned the attack.
Under pressure, Britain and France withdrew in humiliation.
Israel pulled back from Sinai after securing temporary guarantees:
UN peacekeepers were stationed on the Egyptian-controlled side of the border.
Egypt agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran, a key maritime route.
🔍 Sidebar: A Staggering Miscalculation – What Were They Thinking?
In retrospect, the Suez Crisis reveals two very different types of strategic thinking — and only one of them worked.
Britain sought to defend its last major imperial asset and reassert global influence. Prime Minister Eden compared Nasser to Hitler and thought a show of force would be applauded. He misread the post-colonial moment entirely.
France wanted revenge for Algerian resistance, which Nasser openly supported. French leaders believed removing him would stem rebellion and restore lost prestige.
Both European powers genuinely believed they could stage a limited war, be seen as peacemakers, and restore their fading influence. This was breathtakingly delusional.
Israel's calculation was entirely different. Israeli leaders had no illusions about being seen as peacekeepers or restoring any imperial order. They had clear, limited tactical goals: stop fedayeen raids, reopen the Straits of Tiran, destroy Egypt's new Soviet weapons, and weaken Nasser's military confidence. They needed European partnership for timing and to absorb international outrage — not for legitimacy.
More importantly, Israel expected the political operation to fail — but calculated they could achieve enough militarily in the short window to make it worthwhile. They let Britain and France absorb most of the international outrage while Israel accomplished maximum damage during the chaos.
The results speak for themselves: The Europeans underestimated the United States, which forced them to withdraw. They misread global public opinion, which saw through their ruse. Instead of collapsing, Nasser emerged stronger — a symbol of Arab dignity. Britain and France were utterly humiliated and lost their Middle Eastern influence permanently.
Israel, by contrast, achieved virtually all its strategic objectives: the Straits reopened, fedayeen bases eliminated, Egyptian military confidence shattered, and a UN buffer force providing a decade of relative quiet on their southern border. Israel accepted temporary international criticism as a small price for lasting strategic gains.
One side was coldly cynical and brilliantly strategic. The other was romantically stupid about a world that no longer existed.
Nasser's Rise and Arab Nationalism
Nasser emerged from Suez emboldened:
He championed Pan-Arabism, seeking to unite the Arab world under Egyptian leadership.
In 1958, he merged Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (which lasted until 1961).
His speeches inspired Arab youth across borders — and stoked anti-Israel rhetoric.
But Nasser's vision concealed growing contradictions:
Palestinian identity was subordinated to Arab unity.
Arab states competed as much as they cooperated, undermining unity.
Despite fiery rhetoric, no coherent plan existed to resolve the Palestinian question.
By the early 1960s, frustration among Palestinians grew. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed — initially backed and controlled by Egypt and other Arab states, but increasingly committed to its own agenda — asserting a distinct Palestinian identity that often diverged from broader Arab nationalist goals.
The View from Gaza
In Gaza, where over 200,000 Palestinian refugees had settled after fleeing the 1948 war, life in the 1950s was marked by hardship and exclusion. The territory remained under Egyptian military administration, not annexed or integrated into Egypt, and Gazans were denied citizenship, mobility, and meaningful political rights.
While Arab states invoked the "Palestinian cause" in regional rhetoric, Palestinians themselves remained sidelined — used symbolically but offered little agency. Gaza became a pressure cooker: economically isolated, politically restricted, and militarized from both within and without. The fedayeen raids may have reflected popular anger, but they were also shaped and sometimes directed by Cairo’s strategic interests.
Aftermath and UNEF Deployment
After the Suez Crisis, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed to stabilize the border region — but only on the Egyptian-controlled side. In the Sinai Peninsula, UNEF maintained a wide buffer zone from Rafah to Sharm el-Sheikh, with key outposts at El-Arish, Abu Ageila, and the Straits of Tiran. In Gaza, which remained under Egyptian military administration (but not formally Egyptian territory), UNEF operated only in the southern sector, particularly around Rafah. They were never permitted on Israeli soil, and their presence depended entirely on Egyptian consent — a critical limitation that directly influenced the events leading to the Six-Day War a decade later.
For Israel, this arrangement provided exactly what they had calculated: a decade of relative quiet on their southern border, protected by an international buffer force, while maintaining the strategic gains that had motivated their participation in the crisis.
Closing Note
By the mid-1960s, Israel faced a radically changed region:
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were more militarized and ideologically charged than ever.
The PLO marked the emergence of Palestinian nationalism as a distinct force, increasingly independent of the Arab regimes that had long spoken for it.
And beneath the surface, unresolved wars, borders, and identities simmered — waiting for a spark.
In Part 4, that spark comes — and changes the map once again.