What Would End the War Between Ukraine and Russia?
I have written extensively about this war. Search my Substack for more.
On May 9th, after Russia’s Victory Day Parade, Vladimir Putin told reporters: “I think that the matter is coming to an end.”
Putin could surely decide on any given day to stop the fighting, and that is how the world tends to frame this conflict — one man’s decision. But what about the Russian people? Where are they in all of this? Victims of an autocratic despot? Do they have any say in when the war stops? Let’s look at the current polling.
What the Polling Shows
Levada Center’s January 2026 numbers tell a more precise story than most Western commentary acknowledges. 74% of Russians believe the war will end in a Russian victory. Under 1% expect Ukraine to win. Around 17% see a stalemate. Meanwhile, 66-67% favor peace talks, and support for ongoing military operations has dropped to 24-25% — the lowest since the full-scale invasion began.
The poll also makes clear that while Russians may want the war to end, they want it to end in a victory. Not a stalemate. Not a face-saving compromise. They are tired of the cost of the war, but not of its goals. That changes everything about what kind of ending is actually possible.
So what does victory actually mean to them? The polling on terms is consistent. Russian sovereignty over all annexed territories — mandatory for roughly 75% of respondents. Permanent Ukrainian neutrality and exclusion from NATO — around 71%. Lifting of sanctions. And critically, any deal needs to be framed as Russia defeating “NATO’s plans” — not as a compromise, and certainly not as a retreat.
They are, almost point for point, Putin’s maximalist stated objectives.
Someone Wins. Someone Loses.
This is not going to end in a clean ceasefire, a stable frozen conflict, or a real negotiated settlement. This war will end when one side is defeated and the other gets its way. Ukraine and Europe will not agree to Russia’s terms. The Russian public — not just Putin, the public — will not accept anything less. The positions do not overlap. There is no politically plausible diplomatic formula that bridges the gap. Wars without a negotiated exit get decided on the battlefield. That is where this one is going.
Zelensky said from the beginning that this would end in Crimea. He’s right. Crimea is where it started twelve years ago and where it will end.
Russia’s own history teaches another lesson. The Crimean War of 1853, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the First World War, Afghanistan, the First Chechen War — every time Russia has lost a war, the regime that lost it has been replaced.
Putin is well aware of this history.
Maybe the War Is Actually Winding Down
So in his remarks to reporters, who is Putin actually talking to when he says “the matter is coming to an end”?
Not the Russian public. He owns Russian state TV — he can tell them anything, anytime. He doesn’t need to give reporters an interview to get a message home. And they aren’t even going to hear what foreign reporters report — the Russian information environment is significantly more closed than it used to be.
The real audience is Europe.
The statement was timed for maximum Western media coverage. The Victory Day parade itself was stripped down — no military hardware on display for the first time in nearly two decades — projecting an image of a Russia exhausted and winding down. He floated Gerhard Schröder as a negotiating partner, a name calibrated to signal pseudo-engagement with Europe. The whole package was designed to do one thing: encourage Europe — leaders and voters alike — to slow-walk the reparations loan, the next aid package, the next round of arms production decisions, on the premise that the war will end soon anyway.
Whether the disinformation actually lands is the open question. Visible Russian losses argue against it. European institutional habits argue for it.
Where Are We Now?
Ukraine is degrading Russia with production-level long-range missiles and drones. Russian refineries, depots, and military logistics deep inside Russia are getting hit routinely. This is clearly visible and deeply unpleasant for the Russian public to see. Russia logged its first net monthly territorial loss in April per ISW tracking, and is wrestling with serious fuel shortages and supply problems sustaining its forces in the field. Recruiting is faltering. The economy is straining.
At the same time, support for Ukraine from Europe and the United States has always been a slow drip and at the bare minimum, and Ukraine has its own manpower issues. Russia continues to grind down Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with sustained strikes on power, water, and heating. The tide is turning in Ukraine’s favor — but only if Ukraine does not run out of manpower or watch its civilian infrastructure collapse.
The honest disclaimer: I have no way to know what the real picture on the ground is. War reporting is partial, and both sides run information operations. But what we can see from the outside suggests Russia is hurting more than its leadership admits, and Ukraine is doing more with less than anyone predicted.
What Iran Teaches Us
Look at Iran. Fifty years of the Islamic Republic have squandered a generation in service of an ideological project no rational accounting could justify. From outside, the whole thing reads as a stupid adventure the regime cannot escape. Russia is doing the same thing. Putin’s war is the equivalent ideological trap — equally impossible to abandon without admitting the entire premise was a lie. From a free society like the United States, none of it makes sense. From inside the trap, the alternatives do not exist.
Iran will force the West to destroy the country before it gives up its dream of nuclear weapons. Russia will destroy itself in a fantasy about NATO threats and the conviction that the Soviet Union needs to be rebuilt.
The Battlefield Will Answer
There is no politically plausible diplomatic formula that bridges the gap. There is only the question of whether Europe finally decides that Ukraine’s survival is worth the cost of ensuring it — or whether it finds another reason to protect its institutions while someone else pays for the outcome.
It would have been smart for the Russians to quit trying to advance four years ago. They aren’t going to. Anyone watching the current situation in Iran might want to ask themselves the same question — and brace for the same answer.